

Message Text

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TO USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

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FOLLOWING REPEATS GENEVA 5784 ACTION DEPT INFO ERDA
GERMANTOWN JULY 21ST

QUOTE

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DISTO

EO 11652: NA

TAGS: PARM, CCD

SUBJECT: CCD-DRAFT PLENARY STATEMENT ON PNE'S

FOLLOWING TEXT IS PROPOSED FOR DELIVERY AT CCD PLENARY.
WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY COMMENTS AND APPROVAL IN TIME
FOR DELIVERY TUESDAY, JULY 29.

BEGIN TEXT.

1. I WOULD LIKE TODAY TO ADDRESS ONCE AGAIN THE
SUBJECT OF THE ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES AND IN PARTICULAR
THE INFORMAL MEETINGS WITH EXPERTS WHICH WERE HELD BY
THE COMMITTEE FROM JULY 14 TO JULY 18.

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2. THE U.S. DELEGATION HAS CAREFULLY REVIEWED THE
MATERIAL DEVELOPED DURING THESE MEETINGS WITH EXPERTS.
THIS REVIEW HAS CONFIRMED THE IMPRESSION WE GAINED
DURING THE MEETINGS--NAMELY, THAT

CONSIDERABLE

INTEREST WAS GENERATED AMONG MANY MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE AND A VALUABLE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND VIEWS TOOK PLACE ON A SUBJECT OF CONSIDERABLE

IMPORTANCE TO ARMS CONTROL. I WISH TO EXPRESS THE APPRECIATION OF MY DELEGATION TO THE DELEGATION OF JAPAN, NOT ONLY FOR ITS INITIATIVE IN PROPOSING THESE MEETINGS BUT ALSO FOR THE CENTRAL CNA CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IT PLAYED IN THE MEETINGS THEMSELVES.

3. A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES MADE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SUCCESS OF THESE INFORMAL MEETINGS. FOR ITS PART, THE U.S. PRESENTED A DETAILED WORKING PAPER AND MADE AVAILABLE FOUR EXPERTS FAMILIAR WITH BOTH THE U.S. PNE PROGRAM AND THE ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS OF PNE'S.

4. IT IS GENERALLY AGREED. AND THIS WAS CONFIRMED BY THE CCD MEETINGS ON PNE'S, THAT A FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM TO BE FACED IN CONNECTION WITH PNE'S IS THAT OF DECIDING HOW TO WEIGHT THEIR POTENTIAL BENEFITS AGAINST THEIR POTENTIALLY SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL AND PROLIFERATION IMPLICATIONS. THE REASON THIS TASK HAS PROVED SO DIFFICULT TO DATE IS THAT BOTH THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND POTENTIAL DANGERS OF PNE'S FLOW DIRECTLY FROM A COMMON CHARACTERISTIC OF ALL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES. THAT IS THE FACT THAT THEY RELEASE EXTREMELY LARGE AMOUNTS OF ENERGY FROM A RELATIVELY SMALL AND LIGHT PACKAGE IN AN EXTREMELY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. THIS CHARACTERISTIC IS THE SOURCE BOTH OF THEIR POTENTIAL UTILITY FOR PEACEFUL ENGINEERING APPLICATIONS AND OF THEIR POTENTIAL UTILITY FOR MILITARY APPLICATIONS.

5. OUR RECENT MEETINGS ON PNE'S MADE CLEAR THE STRONG DESIRE OF THE GREAT MAJORITY OF PARTICIPANTS TO AVOID LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TO MOVE TOWARD MORE COMPREHENSIVE AND EFFECTIVE FORMS OF CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS. IT WAS ALSO CLEAR THAT PNE'S SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO SERVE AS A VEHICLE FOR FRUSTRATING PROGRESS TOWARD THESE TWO ESSENTIAL GOALS.

6. THESE CONSIDERATIONS ARE NOT NEW BUT WERE ALREADY WELL UNDERSTOOD AT THE TIME THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY WAS NEGOTIATED. THE PROVISIONS OF THE NPT WERE CAREFULLY FORMULATED TO FURTHER THESE ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES WITHOUT. HOWEVER, DENYING NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES ANY POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF PNE'S THAT MIGHT BE REALIZED

BY THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY. THE WISDOM OF THE APPROACH TAKEN IN THE NPT WAS CONFIRMED BY THE RECENT REVIEW CONFERENCE, AND THE US CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT THE NPT REGIME PROVIDES THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND DESIRABLE APPROACH TO THE PNE ARMS CONTROL PROBLEM. WHAT IS NEW, PERHAPS, IS THE RECENT EMERGENCE OF PNE'S AS A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL ISSUE. THIS IS DUE TO A NUMBER OF FACTORS; THE ADDITION LAST YEAR OF A SIXTH STATE HAVING A DEMONSTRATED NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY; THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON A THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY AND THE CURRENT US-USSR NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD A PNE AGREEMENT, AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE THRESHOLD TREATY; THE RECENT REVIEW OF THE NPT; AND THE CHANGING ASSESSMENT IN MANY COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE US, OF THE ROLE WHICH PNE MIGHT REALISTICALLY BE EXPECTED TO PLAY IN THEIR ECONOMIES.

7. DURING THE INFORMAL MEETINGS, THE US EXPERTS ENDEAVORED TO RESPOND FULLY TO MANY PENETRATING QUESTIONS RELATING TO THESE COMPLEX PROBLEMS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE WERE NOT ABLE TO PRESENT DETAILED INFORMATION ON VERIFICATION SYSTEMS WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT OF CURRENT US-USSR PNE NEGOTIATIONS, NOR TO SPECULATE ON THE POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, EXPECT TO DISCUSS WITH THE CCD THE CONTENT AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ANY PNE AGREEMENT THAT IS FAIRLY CONCLUDED.

8. DURING THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE ARMS CONTROL IMPLEMENTED OFFICIAL USE
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CATIONS OF PNE'S A NUMBER OF SPEAKERS REAFFIRMED THEIR VIEWS THAT PROCEDURES CONSISTENT WITH NPT ARTICLE V ARE THE APPROPRIATE WAY FOR NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES TO GAIN ACCESS TO THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF PNE'S. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE IMPORTANT WORK AND THE CENTRAL ROLE OF THE IAEA WAS OFTEN NOTED. IT IS, OF COURSE, AN OBVIOUS FACT THAT ANY PNE'S MUST BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS INCLUDING, IN PARTICULAR, THE LTBT. IN THIS CONNECTION THE US EXPERTS POINTED OUT THAT THE USE HAS NO PRESENT PLANS TO CONDUCT EXCAVATION PNE'S.

9. A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT POINTS WERE FOUND GENERAL ACCEPTANCE DURING THE DISCUSSIONS. FIRST OF ALL, THE U.S. EXPERTS MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD NOT SEE HOW NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES COULD BE DEVELOPED THAT WOULD NOT BE CAPABLE OF MILITARY APPLICATION. IT FOLLOWS FROM THIS THAT THERE IS NO RELIABLE WAY OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN A "PNE POWER" AND A NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE. THERE WAS NO DISAGREEMENT EXPRESSED ON THIS

ESSENTIAL POINT IN OUR MEETINGS.

10. AT THE SAME TIME NO DISAGREEMENT WAS EXPRESSED WITH THE VIEW OF THE US EXPERTS THAT THE EXPLOSION OF NUCLEAR DEVICES SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED FOR PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY ADD SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE MILITARY CAPABILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTING STATES THAT ALREADY POSSESSED A VARIETY OF SOPHISTICATED NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THUS, WHETHER A PNE PROGRAM WOULD OR WOULD NOT PROVIDE WEAPON-RELATED BENEFITS FOR A NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE WOULD DEPEND UPON THE EXTENT AND CHARACTER OF THAT STATE'S EXISTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES THE NATURE OF ANY CONSTRAINTS ON ITS WEAPON TESTING ACTIVITIES, AND THE LEVEL AND NATURE OF ITS PNE ACTIVITY.

11. THE GENERAL PROPOSITION WAS PUT FORWARD THAT NEITHER NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES NOR NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES SHOULD BE ABLE TO USE A PNE PROGRAM TO OBTAIN NUCLEAR WEAPONS-RELATED BENEFITS NOT OTHERWISE AVAILABLE TO IT. THIS MEANS THAT ANY CONSTRAINTS ON NUCLEAR LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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WEAPONS TESTS BY THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY APPROPRIATE CONSTRAINTS ON PNE'S, AND BY VERIFICATION BY APPROPRIATE CONSTRAINTS ON PNE'S, AND BY VERIFICATION PROCEDURES ADEQUATE TO ASSURE THAT SUCH CONSTRAINTS ARE BEING OBSERVED. NONE OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN OUR MEETING DISAGREED WITH THIS GENERAL PROPOSITION.

12. THE ULTIMATE NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTING CONSTRAINT IS,

OF COURSE, AN ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE CTB. DURING OUR MEETINGS SEVERAL STATES, INCLUDING THE US, REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THIS GOAL. UNDER A CTB, THERE WOULD BE NO TESTING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY PARTIES AND THE OBJECTIVE OF PREVENTING THE ACQUISITION OF WEAPON-RELATED BENEFITS FROM A PNE PROGRAM WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE THAN UNDER LESS RESTRICTIVE AGREEMENTS. IF PNE'S WERE TO BE ACCOMMODATED UNDER A CTB, THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED UNDER A VERIFICATION REGIME WHICH PROVIDED ADEQUATE ASSURANCE TO ALL STATES THAT NO WEAPON-RELATED BENEFITS WERE BEING ACQUIRED FROM PNE ACTIVITIES. ALTHOUGH THERE IS GENERAL RECOGNITION OF THIS PROBLEM, I THINK IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT WE DO NOT YET HAVE AN CONSENSUS ON ITS SOLUTION. FURTHER CREATIVE EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES CONNECTED WITH PNE'S ARE NEEDED IN THE CONTEXT OF FURTHER CONSTRAINTS ON THE TESTING OF

NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MANY STATESN BOTH THOSE WIT AND
THOSE WITHOUT EXPERIENCE IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIVES, CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THIS IMPORTANT TASK.

13. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT EXCHANGES SUCH
AS THOSE THAT TOOK PLACE HERE THIS MONTH, CAN HELP TO
SOLVE THE DIFFICULT AND IMPORTANT ARMS CONTROL PROBLEMS
POSED BY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. END TEXT. DALE
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